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The main hypothesis is that conciliation institutions are evolving into an element of public policy, fulfilling the function of managing social risks and reducing systemic entropy. Conflict is analyzed through the lens of externality theory as a phenomenon generating significant negative externalities for third parties, markets, and social stability. In this regard, judicial overload is viewed not as a cause, but as a symptom of a deeper dysfunction. The paper argues that public interest in modern complex societies is shifting from a monopoly on judicial dispute resolution to ensuring the proportionality of state intervention, which implies the active encouragement of pre-trial settlements. It is concluded that the role of the state is transforming from that of arbitrator to moderator, interested in creating an infrastructure for constructive conflict management. Thus, conciliation procedures, while retaining their formal discretion, acquire public-law significance, becoming a mechanism for maintaining the stability of the socio-economic system.
Keywords:conciliation procedures, mediation, public interest, social risks, conflict externalities, judicial system, pre-trial settlement.
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