Time of substancial concept: history and modernity

Lolaev Totraz Petrovich, Gabaraev Anatoly Dmitrievich

The work is devoted to the history of the substantial concept of time, to the time when it originated and developed, and how I. Newton introduced it into physics with all the ensuing consequences. In this regard, the article examines the positive and negative aspects of the substantial concept of time, makes generalizations and conclusions about its significance for science in the past and present. It also emphasizes that A. Einstein rejected the classical concepts of absolute, independent time. Thus, A. Einstein, instead of the substantial concept of time by I. Newton, proposed the relational concept of time, in which time was no longer a physical entity. In addition, the study reveals the degree of correspondence and inconsistency of the scientific provisions of the substantial and functional concepts of time, developed in the 70s of the last century, in which time, as in the theory of relativity, is nonsubstantial, is not a physical entity. As a result of the analysis of the history of the emergence and evolution of the substantial and other concepts of time, their relationship and confrontation in the light of the current level of their development, it is allowed to create a single concept of time, based on the synthesis of various concepts of time.

Keywords:Substantial concept of time, absolute time, relative time, functional concept of time, objectively real time, functional time, non-substantial time, eternity of the world, eternity of time.