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The article is devoted to the peculiarities of Magnus Maximus' foreign policy. Commander of the British garrisons and former colleague of Theodosius I, was proclaimed Emperor by the troops and established his authority in Britain, Spain and Gaul in 383. The study thoroughly analyzes reports from a large group of written sources, including the New History of Zosimus, the letters of Ambrose of Mediolan, the Church stories of Rufinus, Socrates and Sozomen. According to the authors, the foreign policy of Magnus Maximus after his approval in Gaul, first of all, was aimed at finding as soon as possible barbarian allies in the upcoming struggle for power. It was this factor that acquired a dominant role in the confrontation between Maximus and Theodosius I and Valentinian II. At the same time, the most acute struggle of the rival emperors was for the federates of Pannonia, who lost their contractual relations with the Empire after the death of Gratian. The importance of relations with these barbarians for Maximus lay in the fact that, because of their strategic location, they could easily block all routes to the west and detain Theodosius I for a long time. The eventual conversion of these barbarians to the side of Valentinian II explained Maximus' refusal to attack the Apennine Peninsula in 383-384. In the future, the usurper suffered a number of failures associated with an attempt to raise a mutiny among the Pannonian federates with the help of the Goths of the Northern Black Sea region and even his own military units specially sent by Maximus to this province. The rashness of his actions and the haste with which Magnus Maximus acted were the main reasons for his defeats, which eventually cost him his life.
Keywords:Roman Empire, Emperor Maximus, Emperor Theodosius I, Emperor Gratian, Emperor Valentinian II, Pannonia, Goths, Huns, federates.
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