THE SUPPLY OF FUEL AND ARTILLERY AMMUNITION TO THE RED ARMY DURING THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE NEAR MOSCOW (WINTER 1941 / 1942) FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Ponomarenko Elena Vladimirovna, Raizman Valeria Vladimirovna

Authors study a supply the Red Army during the Winter Counteroffensive by Moscow through the prism of comparing the supply of ammunition and fuel Soviet troops during the armed conflict on the KhalkhinGol River and the First Soviet-Finnish War (the "Winter War"). Authors also refer to comparisons with the wehrmacht. Authors concluded that during the Winter Counteroffensive by Moscow, the formations of the Western and Kalinin fronts were supplied with fuel and artillery ammunition worse than the Soviet forces during the "Winter War" and during the armed conflict on the riverKhalkhinGol, firepower and the use of aviation were also at a lower level during the Winter Counteroffensive near Moscow. According to authors, it was the winter of 1941 / 1942 as equipment was replaced by people near Moscow. This largely explains the heavy losses of the Red Army during the counteroffensive phase of the Battle for Moscow. Authors rely on a number of archival documents that are little known in Russian historiography, including documents from the collections of the Russian State Military Archive. The authors also question the widespread notion in historiography and popular literature that the wehrmacht was poorly supplied with artillery ammunition in the winter of 1941 / 1942.

Keywords:The Great Patriotic War, the Winter Counteroffensive near Moscow, the Battle for Moscow, the armed conflict on the KhalkhinGol River, the Kalinin Front, the rear of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, the "Winter War".